### GENEVA GRADUATE INSTITUTE

INSTITUT DE HAUTES ÉTUDES INTERNATIONALES ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT

GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES



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### Feedback on midterms

- Generally very well done
- Grades /30, where  $15 \approx 4.00$
- Reminder: choice of centrality measure should be well motivated, not just an index of all —
- Reminder: which community detection algorithm produces highest modularity and/or most interpretable/sensible results
- Reminder: nodes in structural holes are called *brokers*; ties linking communities are called *bridges*
- Reminder: may need to tweak/play with graphs until they illustrate clearly the message you've decided they convey













Actor vs tie models

### SAOM

### Estimation





### MOM vs MLE

### Selection vs Influence

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# Why Network Dynamics

- Because we want to know *why* there are associations \_
  - E.g. why are depressed people more likely to have depressed friends?
- *Competing* explanations tend to involve *dynamic* mechanisms:
  - because depressed people prefer depressed friends \_
  - because non-depressed people avoid the depressed —
  - because the depressed withdraw from friendly interactions which destroys all other friendships
  - because depression is contagious along friendships

Schaefer et al 2012







- Same group of actors (some composition change allowed) 1.
- Same relational variable (states not events) 2.
- Some, but not too much change 3.

# Typical data: panel

# Repeated measures Network wave 2

### Which forces shape this social network's evolution?

Network wave 1













# Individuals form and maintain reciprocal ties







# Transitivity leads to clustering







# Status hierarchy shapes friendship networks popular actors





Network wave 1





### What else?



# Gender homophily?

Network wave 1





# Ethnic homophily?

Network wave 1





# Modelling thoughts

- A statistical approach is necessary to control for alternative explanations \_
- complete pool of candidates is known
- A longitudinal approach is necessary to link antecedents with consequences —

- A complete network approach is necessary because selection can only be studied when the

A (weak) methodologically individualist approach is useful to bring the model close to theory

See Udehn 2002





### Model





### SAOM

### Estimation

### Influence



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## SAOMs are not ERGMs

- SAOMs are a continuous-time network model
  - They model change in social networks in continuous-time using empirical panel data with SIENA (Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis) (see Block et al 2018)
- SAOMs are an **actor-oriented** network model
  - They model change as a function of individuals' choices about whom they want to relate to and how they want to behave (see Block et al 2019)



# Why Continuous-Time?

Because complex patterns emerge from simple(r) mechanisms



- New ties may be *realisation-contingent* on other new ties.
  - Cannot easily model compound emergence in discrete-time. \_

# Why Actor-Oriented?

- All social network change is brought about by individual or collective agents that decide to send \_ or drop a tie (homophily, withdrawal, avoidance, etc)
- As the actor is the locus of control, we should model the tie changes from its perspective









### Intuition

### Continuous-Time

This is one potential path how the network develops from  $t_1$  to  $t_2$ 













# The glowing actor DECIDES what tie change is most appealing.





### The glowing actor does not remember the betrayal by the pink actor



# Two Processes in Each Ministep







## The Two Functions

- Who gets a choice?
  - This is the first part of the ministep \_\_\_\_
  - A person (*ego* or the *focal actor*) is chosen to consider a change
- Who/what do they choose?
  - Once an ego is chosen, we model which change she makes from her point of view
  - In the case of a network tie, the candidates are people (*alters*)

### **Rate Function**

$$\lambda_i(x) = \exp\left(\sum_k \rho_k r_{ik}(x)\right)$$

**Evaluation Function** 

$$f_i(x) = \sum_k \beta_k s_{ik}(x)$$

- Models how much change there is between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ \_
  - Higher rates mean more change -
  - This can mean more ministeps than changes
    - -
    - choices

The Rate Function  $\lambda_i(x) = \exp\left(\sum_{k} \rho_k r_{ik}(x)\right)$ 

More ministeps necessary to provide actors with more opportunities to make more changes

Some actors, when given opportunity to make a tie change, may decide they are actually satisfied Some actors may revert earlier tie changes once local neighbourhood changes as a result of others'

- Models how many opportunities each actor receives in a time period (between waves) -- Statistics  $r_{ik}(x)$  of i's neighbourhood in x are weighted by parameters  $\rho_k$ 
  - - These weights express whether actors in those configurations correlate with more  $(\rho_k > 0)$  or less  $(\rho_k < 0)$  change
- ((Technically,  $\lambda_i(x)$  is part of a (non-homogenous) Poisson process)) -
- Current studies typically assume a periodwise constant rate

The Rate Function  $\lambda_i(x) = \exp\left(\sum_{k} \rho_k r_{ik}(x)\right)$ 

But see Hollway 2020



### The Evaluation Function



- the current network
  - Statistics  $s_{ik}(x)$  of *i*'s neighbourhood in *x* are weighted by parameters  $\beta_k$ \_\_\_\_
    - \_\_\_\_  $(\beta_k < O)$

 $f_i(x) = \sum_k \beta_k s_{ik}(x)$ 

### Models attractiveness of different network states x to actor *i* reachable within one step of

These weights express whether such configurations are desired ( $\beta_k > 0$ ) or avoided

### The Evaluation Function

- Models actors' choices
  - A value is calculated for each potential alter
  - The estimation: Ties must have increased an evaluation function
  - The model: The alter that increases the evaluation function most is chosen -
- ((Technically,  $f_i(x)$  is part of a multinomial logit model for discrete, probabilistic choice)) —
- This is where the action is. It helps us answer questions like whether we prefer happy friends or avoid depressed people.

 $f_i(x) = \sum_k \beta_k s_{ik}(x)$ 

### Statistics and Effects

- By finding out how effects are weighted (the parameters), we can answer our research questions —
- Each effect ("IV") has an effect statistic which defines it -
  - Are the popular popular?
    - Indegree popularity effect:
  - Are non-depressed people popular?
    - Alter attribute effect:
  - Are the depressed choosing to hang out together?
    - Homophily effect:
- whether it is the same as *i*), or both

$$s_i(x) = \sum_j x_{ij} \sum_k x_{kj}$$
$$s_i(x) = \sum_j x_{ij} v_j$$
$$s_i(x) = \sum_j x_{ij} I\{v_i = v_j\}$$

They can depend on network configurations (i.e. the position of *j* in the network), or attributes (i.e. a characteristic of *j* or



effe	ect	network
1.	outdegree	$\mathbf{x}_{ij}$
2.	reciprocity	$\mathbf{x}_{ij}\mathbf{x}_{ji}$
З.	transitive triplets	$\mathbf{x}_{ij}\sum_{h}\mathbf{x}_{ij}$
4.	balance	x <sub>ij</sub> strsir
5.	actors at distance two	∫1 if bet  0 else
б.	popularity alter	x <sub>ij</sub> ∑ <sub>h</sub> s
7.	activity alter	x <sub>ij</sub> ∑ <sub>h</sub> s
8.	3-cycles	$\mathbf{x}_{ij}\sum_{h}\mathbf{x}_{ij}$
9.	betweenness	$\sum_{\mathbf{h}} bett$
10.	dense triads	$\sum_{h} g_{IO}$
11.	peripheral	$\sum_{hk} pe$
12.	similarity	$\mathbf{x}_{ij} \sin_{ij}$
13.	behavior alter	$\mathbf{x}_{ij}\mathbf{z}_{j}$
14.	behavior ego	$\mathbf{x}_{ij}\mathbf{z}_i$
15.	similarity × reciprocity	$\mathbf{x}_{ij}\mathbf{x}_{ji}$ sin
16.	between dis- similar alters	$\sum_{h} (1$
17.	similarity × dense triads	$\sum_{h} grooter$
18.	behavior × peripheral	$z_i \sum_{hk}$
19.	similarity $\times$ peripheral	∑ <sub>tik</sub> (p ×

Illustrations are not exhaustive.

### Myriad Effects

SELECTION OF POSSIBLE EFFECTS FOR MODELING NETWORK EVOLUTION				
rk statistic	effective tra	ansition	s in network*	verbal description
	0 0	↔	<b>00</b>	preference for ties to arbitrary others
	6—0	↓	е <del>ш</del> о	preference for reciprocated ties
$\mathbf{x}_{ih}\mathbf{x}_{hj}$	o∽ <b>₽</b>	⇔	4	preference for being friend of the friends' friends
im <sub>ij</sub>	V	$\leftrightarrow$	$\nabla$	preference for ties to structurally similar others
etween(h;ij) = 1 for some h	o Tirio	$\longleftrightarrow$	oo	preference for keeping others at social distance two
•	(the <i>number</i> of intermediaries is irrelevant)			
, X <sub>hj</sub>	°	$\leftrightarrow$	~?	preference for attaching to popular others, i.e., others who are often named as friend ('preferential attachment')
x <sub>jh</sub>	οÎ	$\longleftrightarrow$	۹Ĵ	preference for attaching to active others, i.e., others who name many friends
$\mathbf{x}_{jh}\mathbf{x}_{hi}$	ぷ	$\leftrightarrow$	ஃ	preference for forming relationship cycles ( negative indicator for hierarchical relations)
etween(i; hj)	e→e e (no direct link fro	$\longleftrightarrow$ m the left	•••••	preference for being be in an intermediary position between unrelated others
coup(ijh)	<b>a</b>	↔	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~	preference for being part of cohesive subgroups
eripheral(i;jhk)		' ↔	250-0	preference for unilaterally attaching to cohesive subgroups
1 <sub>ij</sub>	••	<b>1</b>	●—● ≎—•○	preference for ties to similar others (selection)
	© ● 0—0	11	o⊸∎ o o	main effect of alter's behavior on tie preference
	• 0 00	11	•—© 0 0	main effect of ego's behavior on tie preference
sim <sub>ij</sub>	●● 00	ţ	• <b></b> •	preference for reciprocated ties to similar others
$(1 - sim_{jh})$ between $(i; jh)$	o⊸o ● ●─0 o		o⊸o⊸e ∎⊸o—o	preference for being in an intermediary position between unrelated, dissimilar others (brokerage potential)
$\operatorname{roup}(ijh)(\operatorname{sim}_{ij} + \operatorname{sim}_{ih})$	$\triangleleft$	$\leftrightarrow$		preference for being part of behaviorally similar cohesive subgroups
peripheral(i;jhk)	a5	• + •	250	behavior-specific preference for unilaterally attaching to cohesive subgroups
(peripheral(i;jhk) ×(sim <sub>ij</sub> +sim <sub>ik</sub> +sim <sub>ik</sub> ))		$\rightarrow \leftrightarrow$	250-0	preference for unilaterally attaching to behaviorally similar cohesive subgroups

TABLE 2

\* In the effective transitions illustrations, it is assumed that the behavioral dependent variable is dichotomous and centered at zero; the color coding is  $\mathbf{O}$  = low score (negative),  $\mathbf{O}$  = high score (positive),  $\mathbf{O}$  = arbitrary score. The tie  $\mathbf{x}_{ij}$  from actor i to actor j is the one that changes in the transition indicated by the double arrow.

### Covariates

- Some effects rely on exogenous information
- There are four types:



For each type, multiple effects can be specified

### Monadic

### Dyadic

coCovar

varCovar

coDyadCovar

varDyadCovar

# Example of an actor's decision



- Options -
  - drop tie to 1
  - drop tie to 2
  - drop tie to 3
  - create tie to 4 —
  - create tie to 5
  - create tie to 6 \_
  - create tie to 7 —
  - keep status quo

alter 5
## Statistics for dropping tie to 1

alter 5



- 2 outgoing ties
- alter 6 1 reciprocated tie
  - 0 transitive triplets
  - 1 three-cycle
  - 0 same colour

## Statistics for creating tie to 4





alter 6 – 3 reciprocated tie

#### alter 5 - 2 transitive triplets

- 2 three-cycles
- 1 same colour



#### These calculations are done for all possible choices

0 same colour —

## Statistics for all options



	#degree	#mutual	#trans	#3cycles	#same col.
Drop 1	2	1	0	1	0
Drop 2	2	1	0	1	0
Drop 3	2	2	2	2	0
<b>Create 4</b>	4	3	2	2	1
Create 5	4	2	2	3	0
Create 6	4	2	2	3	1
Create 7	4	2	2	3	1
Status quo	3	2	2	2	0

## Evaluating the options

 $f_i(x) = \sum_k \beta_k s_{ik}(x) \qquad \beta_{\text{degree }\beta_{\text{mutual }\beta_{\text{trans }}\beta_{\text{3cycles }}\beta_{\text{same }}} \beta_{\text{same }}$ 

$f_i(drop1)$	Dro
$f_i(drop 2)$	Dro
$f_i(drop3)$	Dro
$f_i$ (create4)	Crea
$f_i$ (create5)	Crea
$f_i$ (create6)	Crea
$f_i$ (create7)	Crea
<i>fi</i> (statusquo)	Status

-2.6 1.8 0.4 -0.7 0.8

	#degree	#mutual	#trans	#3cycles	#same col.
Drop 1	2	1	0	1	0
Drop 2	2	1	0	1	0
Drop 3	2	2	2	2	0
Create 4	4	3	2	2	1
Create 5	4	2	2	3	0
Create 6	4	2	2	3	1
C <b>reate 7</b>	4	2	2	3	1
tatus quo	3	2	2	2	0

## Transforming to probabilities

## Using underlying multinomial:

	Evaluation	Exponent.	Pı
Drop 1	-4.1	0.017	1
Drop 2	-4.1	0.017	1
Drop 3	-2.2	0.111	6
Create 4	-4.8	0.008	٦
Create 5	-8.1	0.000	(
Create 6	-7.3	0.001	1
Create 7	-7.3	0.001	1
Status quo	-4.8	0.008	٩

 $p_{i \sim j}(x,\beta) = \frac{\exp\left(f(x^{i \sim j},\beta)\right)}{\sum_{k=1}^{n} \exp\left(f(x^{i \sim j},\beta)\right)}$ 













### SAOM

#### Estimation

#### Influence



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## Estimation

- But what we usually want to do is *estimate* parameters from *observed* data!
- We do this using RSiena ("SIENA" = Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis)



- So we now have a well-defined probability model, from which we can simulate networks using defined parameters ( $\beta$ )



## SIENA estimates SAOMs through simulations



The parameters are "good" descriptors of the social processes shaping network 2

#### Simulations

adjust parameters **no** similar to network 2?

yes



## Three Estimation Methods

- Method of Moments (MoM) -
  - Take the network at the first time point and simulate a certain number of mini-steps with some initial  $\beta$  values —
  - Compare the simulated networks to the observed network at the second time point
  - According to the differences between observed and simulated networks, update  $\beta$  values -
  - Rinse and repeat until the simulated networks "closely" resemble the observed one —
- Maximum Likelihood (ML) \_
  - Actually connects two observations by chains of ministeps and estimates parameters from these chains —
- Bayesian (Bayes)
  - For multilevel analysis of networks and enthusiasts



## Estimation Results

- While the model is more complicated,
  RSiena spits out a table at the end, the
  second part of which can be interpreted
  like that of a multinomial regression
- Each parameter estimate has a standard error
- If the *t*-ratio  $(=\beta/se) \ge 2$ , then we can say that we can reject the null hypothesis of there being no effect

	M	odel 1	Model 1	Model 3	
ate functi	ion frie	endship			
ate of cha	n <b>gð</b> 4t <sub>1</sub>	$\rightarrow$ t <sub>2</sub>	8,817,54 (0,97)	10,87 (2,63)	
ate of cha	n&3t <sub>2</sub>	$\rightarrow$ t <sub>3</sub>	2,92,73 (0,45)	3,04 (0,52)	
ate of cha	nze9t3	$\rightarrow$ t <sub>4</sub>	3,56,29 (0,49)	3,80 (0,65)	
bjective f	unctio	n friendship			
utdegree	-1,92		-2,03,92 (0,17) ***	-2,19 (0,16)	* * *
eciprocity	<u> </u>		1,09 —	0,84 (0,17)	* * *
ransitive t	rip <del>let</del> s			0,18 (0,03)	* * *
rimary sch	100 <b>54</b> rie	endship	0,30,54 (0,21) *	0,40 (0,20)	*
fale alter	0,30		0,28,30 (0,18)	0,05 (0,17)	
Iale ego	0,11	strongly	0,070,11-(0,19)	-0,17- <del>(0,18)</del> -	
ame sex	1,70	biased	1,39,70 (0,18) ***	0,93 (0,18)	* * *





## Model Specification

- Researchers usually come with <i>theory</i>	R
or at least <i>hypotheses</i>	R
- SAOMs are not for exploration	R R
	0
- Beware spuriousness	O R
- Attribute vs centrality (popularity)	T
- Homophily vs cohesion (reciprocity,	pı M
transitivity)	M
	S

	Mode	1	Model 1	Model 3	
ate functi	ion friends	ship			
ate of cha	$ng \delta 4t_1 \rightarrow $	$t_2$	8,817,54 (0,97)	10,87 (2,63)	
ate of cha	$n_{2}a_{3}t_{2} \rightarrow $	t <sub>3</sub>	2,92,73 (0,45)	3,04 (0,52)	
ate of cha	$n_{3} = 9t_{3} \rightarrow 1$	t <sub>4</sub>	3,56,29 (0,49)	3,80 (0,65)	
bjective f	function fr	iendship			
utdegree	-1,92		-2,03,92 (0,17) ***	-2,19 (0,16)	* * *
eciprocity	r		1,09 —	0,84 (0,17)	* * *
ransitive	trip <del>let</del> s			0,18 (0,03)	* * *
rimary sch	100,54 friends	ship	0,30,54 (0,21) *	0,40 (0,20)	*
fale alter	0,30		0,230,30 (0,18)	0,05 (0,17)	
Iale ego	0,11	strongly	0,070,11-(0,19)	-0,17- <del>(0,</del> 18)-	
ame sex	1,70	biased	1,39,70 (0,18) ***	0,93 (0,18)	* * *





## Parameter Interpretation

- Estimated parameters need to be interpreted as within ministeps and against other choices
- \_ two alters,  $j_1$  or  $j_2$ , that differ only on one statistic value, then the odds ratio is as follows:

$$\frac{p_{i \rightsquigarrow j_1}}{p_{i \rightsquigarrow j_2}} = \frac{exp\left(f(x^{i \rightsquigarrow j_1}, \beta)\right)}{exp\left(f(x^{i \rightsquigarrow j_2}, \beta)\right)} = \frac{\exp(\beta s_{j_1})}{\exp(\beta s_{j_2})}$$

reciprocity parameter of 2,  $\frac{\exp(2 \times 1)}{2} = 7.39$  $\exp(2 \times 0)$ 

- *i* is 7.39 times more likely to send a tie to  $j_1$  than  $j_2$ 

So we interpret the parameters as: when a chosen ego *i* is faced with a decision to form a tie to either of

So, say *i* can send a tie to  $j_1$  or  $j_2$ , which only differ in that  $j_1$  sends a tie to *i* and  $j_2$  does not, then given a





## Diagnostics



## But what does "good" mean?



The parameters are "good" descriptors of the social processes shaping network 2

yes

## Target statistics Z are listed in the SIENA output file

Observed values of target statistics are

- 1. Number of ties
- 2. Number of reciprocated ties
- 3. Number of transitive triplets
- 4. 3-cycles
- 5. Sum of squared indegrees
- 6. Same values on coo.coCovar
- 7. Sum of indegrees x gender.coCovar
- 8. Sum of outdegrees x gender.coCovar
- 9. Same values on gender.coCovar
- MoM aims at creating networks that have statistics close to the ones above
- degree distribution, the triad census, etc? (i.e. goodness of fit)

99.0000 72.0000 164.0000 47.0000 403.0000 47.0000 -5.0345 -4.0345 90.0000

- More formally, parameters  $\theta = \{\varrho, \beta\}$  that generate networks for which  $E_{\theta} = \{Z\}$  and are stable have converged

But do these simulated networks resemble other, non-modelled macro features of the network such as the





## So, which forces shape this social network's evolution?

Network wave 1



Network wave 2







Network wave 2



\_ does not represent groups very well...

## Degree + Reciprocity

Simulated network



While the model has converged and the two parameters are highly significant, the model

## + Transitivity and 3-Cycles

Network wave 2



Group boundaries are clearer but there are still too many connections between groups \_

Simulated network



## + Gender Homophily

Network wave 2



- One could try further structural and attribute-related effects

Simulated network



- Fewer links between groups of different gender but still many between-group ties within a gender



## sienaGOF() does this comparison more systematically

- to the empirically observed networks
  - Degree distribution —
  - Geodesic distances \_\_\_\_
  - Triad census
- where we only looked at one

sienaGOF() tests particular macro features of the simulated social networks and compares them

sienaGOF() takes all simulated networks into account, as opposed to the visual inspection,









## Indegree GOF

#### Goodness of Fit of IndegreeDistribution

## Outdegree GOF



#### Goodness of Fit of OutdegreeDistribution

## Geodesic GOF



#### Goodness of Fit of GeodesicDistribution

p: 0.356

## Triad census GOF



#### Goodness of Fit of TriadCensus

## Standard Model

#### Single

#### Binary Directed 1-mode Network Change

## Model Extensions

# SingleBinaryDirectedIIIIMultiplexOrderedIUndirectedI



## Model Extensions

# Single Binary Directed Multiplex Ordered Undirected











## SAOM

#### Estimation

#### Influence



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## An example from my childhood friend Jael...

- Manifest homophily: Jael and I are friends because we both jump off bridges
- Secondary homophily, observable: Jael and I are friends because we are in the same Selection travelling and thrill-seeking club
  - Latent homophily, unobservable: Jael and I both like going on rollercoasters
  - Common external causation: Jael and I are on the Stari Most on 9 November 1993 and jumping is safer than staying on a bridge that is being destroyed by Croat forces
  - Biological contagion: Jael infected me with a virus that makes people jump off bridges
  - Social influence: Jael inspired me

#### Influence

## Now networks or behaviour may change at ministeps



- Still two discrete observations \_
- \_



Still assume continuous process of change, but now interpolates network-tie changes with behavioural changes





## SAOM allows discrete changes on both levels



- \_

Changes are actor-oriented: individuals can decide to change their outgoing ties or their behaviour Two Poisson processes determine time intervals between subsequent changes in each dependent variable





# Process Markovian (and thus myopic)

- —

Both highlighted individuals have the same probability to change their behaviour.

- If social influence is present, they might have an increased likelihood to become red.

## Behaviour change can be discrete or continuous

- Once individuals reconsider their behaviour, they can increase, decrease, or maintain it
- Actual choice modelled with a multinomial probability (up, down, stay)
- This means successive opportunities are required for large-scale behavioural changes
- Model is very similar to network change model



Niezink et al 2019





- Network (and behaviour) change is observed across repeated measures
- This discrete change decomposed into continuous-time ministeps and modelled from an actororiented perspective
  - The frequency of these ministeps and which actors are offered an opportunity to change their ties/behaviour is modelled by the rate function
  - What happens during these ministeps/opportunities is modelled by an evaluation function, and the effects included here tend to be most related to research questions
- The Method of Moments estimation procedure seeks to find stable parameter values that simulate networks that match the target statistics of the effects included and are stable (convergence) and also replicate salient macro-structural features (goodness-of-fit)






### **Tie-Oriented**

#### **Cross-Sectional /Panel Data**

#### **Time-Stamped** Data

#### **Actor-Oriented**



SAOMs



DyNAMs











# SAOM

## Estimation





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